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Self and Affect: The Case of Nostalgia 
  Imagine you are walking through your neighbourhood on a breezy spring 
afternoon and you see a child running excitedly after a ball tossed from a friend. You 
begin to think about your own childhood and perhaps bask in the glow of the bygone 
days of frivolous play and exuberance. What are the cognitive abilities that enable, 
and the psychological functions served by, such nostalgic reflection?  More broadly, 
what is the social psychological significance of this emotion? In entertaining such 
questions, one may be surprised to learn that contemporary social psychological 
discourse currently offers few answers as the emotion has largely been neglected by 
mainstream empirical circles. The purpose of the present chapter is to provide a 
framework through which such questions may be addressed and present a social 
psychological analysis of nostalgia. 
We suggest that at the core of understanding nostalgia is the interplay between 
self and affect. As such, we will begin by covering three manifestations of this 
interplay. The self – and more specifically the ability to reflect back on the self – is of 
critical importance for nostalgic reflection and thus we will first review literature on 
the relation between mood states and self-focused attention. Moreover, we 
conceptualize nostalgia as a primarily positive emotional experience, though often 
with some bittersweet elements, that helps to foster a positive self-conception. Thus, 
second, we will discuss the relation between mood states and the valence of self-
views. Third, because nostalgia may be informatively considered as a type of self-
conscious emotion, we will briefly couch the link between self and affect in terms of 
self-conscious emotions and note those that have been the primary subject of 
empirical scrutiny: shame, guilt, and embarrassment. Finally and most importantly, we   3 
 
will propose a new self-conscious emotion, nostalgia. In particular, we will review the 
extant literature on nostalgia, offer a new conceptualization of the construct, present 
recent research findings, and explicate the similarities and differences between 
nostalgia and other self-conscious emotions. 
The Interplay between Self and Affect: Mood and Self-Focused Attention, 
Mood and Self-Description, Self-Conscious Emotion 
Mood States and Self-Focused Attention 
A persistent focus of the literature on self and affect has been the interplay 
between mood states and self-focused attention. One of the initial observations of this 
connection emerged from classic work on self-awareness theory (Duval & Wicklund, 
1972). According to theory and research from this perspective, increased self-focused 
instigates regulatory processes, often heightening awareness of discrepancies between 
self and evaluative standards, and thus engendering feelings of negative affect (e.g., 
Scheier & Carver, 1977; see Fejfar & Hoyle, 2000 for a review). A considerable 
literature has also been guided by the reciprocal question; that is: “What mood states 
lead to which kind of attentional focus?” (Sedikides & Green, 2000). The mood states 
of sadness and happiness attracted the bulk of empirical efforts. Further, attentional 
focus was conceptualized as falling on a bipolar continuum: directed either internally 
(i.e., to the self) or externally (e.g., to other persons).  
In line with appraisal theories of emotion (Smith, this volume; Smith & 
Ellsworth, 1985), sadness was hypothesized to induce self-focused attention. Sadness 
is elicited by a personal setback or loss, is accompanied by the perception that the 
unfortunate event is rather uncontrollable and inevitable, and is associated with or 
leads to inaction, resignation, passivity and withdrawal. Sadness instigates an   4 
 
avoidance orientation toward the outside world and an inclination to turn inward and 
clarify the implications of the unfortunate event for one’s goals and behavioral 
options. On the other hand, happiness is characterized by an expansive, exploratory, 
and affiliative orientation. Happiness is linked with stimulation seeking and the 
facilitation of adaptive or approach behaviors. As such, happiness was hypothesized 
to induce other-focused attention. 
The empirical findings were consistent with these hypotheses. Compared to 
neutral mood, sadness induces self-focused attention (Sedikides, 1992a), whereas 
happiness induces external-focused attention (Green, Sedikides, Saltzberg, Wood, & 
Forzano, 2003). Moreover, the causal relation between sadness and self-focused 
attention is not reciprocal: Sadness directly elicits self-focused attention, but the 
reverse pattern does not hold. Instead, the effects of self-focused attention on sadness 
are moderated by self-concept valence. Self-focused attention induces sadness only 
among individuals with chronically negative self-views (Sedikides, 1992b). 
More recently, however, the literature moved beyond sadness and happiness 
by taking into account another, orthogonal, affective dimension: orientation. In 
particular, (negative or positive) mood states can be either reflective or social. 
Examples of reflective mood states are sadness and contentment, whereas examples of 
social mood states are anger and happiness. Reflective states should elicit stronger 
self-focused attention than social states, a hypothesis that was empirically validated 
(Green & Sedikides, 1999). As we will discuss, one of the possibly unique features of 
nostalgia is that it is both a reflective and social emotion. 
Mood States and Self-Concept Valence 
Sad and happy mood states also have distinct consequences for self-concept   5 
 
valence. An early review (Sedikides, 1992c) captured these consequences with the 
mood-congruency principle: Sad mood increases the negativity of self-conceptions, 
whereas happy mood increases the positivity of self-conceptions. A comprehensive 
model on the relation between mood and social cognition, however, the Affect 
Infusion Model (AIM: Forgas, 1995, 2002, this volume) offered theoretical insights 
that qualified the mood congruency principle. 
According to the AIM, affect is infused differentially into information 
processing strategies. In some strategies, such as the direct-access strategy (when 
processing is based on the cognitive retrieval of knowledge structures) and the 
motivated-processing strategy (when processing is goal-driven), affect infusion is low. 
In other strategies, such as heuristic processing (requiring an on-line judgment) or 
substantive processing (requiring an open information search and the transformation 
or creation of cognitive structures), affect infusion is high. The postulates of the AIM 
have clear implications for the influence of mood states on the self-concept. Affect 
will infuse the self-system and change the self-views in a mood-congruent manner 
only when these self-views are relatively uncertain or loosely formed. However, affect 
will have no influence on self-views that are crystallized and well-formed. The former 
(i.e., peripheral self-conceptions) are computed via an on-line judgment, whereas the 
latter (i.e., central self-conceptions) require the retrieval of a stored judgment. Thus, 
heuristic processing is involved in judgments of peripheral self-views, whereas direct 
access processing is involved in judgments of central self-views. 
The empirical evidence was consistent with these hypotheses. The mood-
congruency effect was obtained for judgments pertaining to peripheral but not central 
self-conceptions (Sedikides, 1995). Notably, support for the AIM model has been   6 
 
obtained in regards to other domains, such as individual differences (Sedikides & 
Green, 2001). For example, mood-congruency effects on self-conceptions are present 
for low, but not high, self-esteem persons. This is attributed to the fact that the self-
views of low self-esteem persons are held with less certainty compared to the self-
views of high self-esteem persons (Campbell et al., 1996). 
The mood-congruency effect is also qualified by the temporal dimension: 
Initial mood-congruent influences on self-views are reversed by subsequent mood-
incongruent influences. In particular, although immediately following sad mood 
induction self-descriptions become more negative, over time this pattern is 
spontaneously reversed, with self-descriptions becoming increasingly positive (Forgas 
& Ciarrochi, 2002, Experiment 3; Sedikides, 1994). These results indicate the 
activation of mood management or mood repair processes (Bless & Fiedler, this 
volume; Erber, this volume; Forgas, in press). 
Self-Conscious Emotions 
The relation between self and affect becomes more intricate when self-
conscious emotions are taken into considerations. The self-conscious emotions that 
have received the lion’s share in the literature are shame, guilt, and embarrassment 
(Keltner & Beer, 2005; Tangney, 2002).  
Self-conscious emotions are instigated by self-evaluation or self-reflection. 
Individuals feel shameful when they perceive the failure to meet an important internal 
standard (i.e., goal or rule) as indicative of a deep and all-encompassing personality 
defect or character flaw. Individuals feel guilty when they also violate an important 
internal standard, but the focus is on the specific transgression and its consequences 
for self and other. Finally, individuals feel embarrassed when they engage in relatively   7 
 
minor infractions of social conventions in a public setting. 
Shame, guilt, and embarrassment differ in terms of how painful they are, how 
they are regulated, and how they are expressed. Shame is more painful than guilt, 
which is more painful than embarrassment (Tangney, 2003). Furthermore, shame is 
linked with anger and aggression (which are attempts to protect the self) and may be 
more strongly tied to situations that focus attention internally (Arndt & Goldenberg, 
2004), whereas guilt is linked with empathy. Both guilt and embarrassment, however, 
are linked with reparative action (e.g., apology). Moreover, shame and embarrassment 
have distinct nonverbal displays, whereas guilt does not. In particular, shame is 
expressed with coordinated gaze and downward head movement, whereas 
embarrassment is expressed through gaze aversion, smile control, a non-Duchenne 
smile, downward head movement, and, on some occasions, face-touching (Keltner, 
1995). 
The Interplay between Self and Affect: Nostalgia 
The literature on self-conscious emotions, while generating important insights, 
has yet to consider the emotional consequences of peoples’ concurrent capacity to 
reflect on the past. In particular, the capacity for self-focus and also the capacity for 
temporal thought (that is, the ability to project oneself into the past, present, and 
future), may enable people to reflect on their past and draw from it the emotion of 
nostalgia. In this light we will next make the case for nostalgia, an emotion that has 
for the most part evaded empirical attention but that we believe is a vital resource in 
peoples’ coping repertoire. We will begin with a historical synopsis and proceed with 
a discussion of the various facets of the nostalgic experience, highlighting the 
psychological landscape and functional significance of the emotion. Our discussion   8 
 
will be informed by the scarce literature on nostalgia and our own preliminary 
findings. 
A Historical Overview of Nostalgia 
The term “nostalgia” was coined by the Swiss physician Johannes Hofer 
(1688/1934), although references to its meaning date back to Hippocrates, Caesar, and 
the Bible. Nostalgia is a compound term, deriving from the Greek words nostos 
(return) and algos (pain). Thus, nostalgia connotes the psychological suffering 
induced by the yearning to return to one’s place of origin. 
In its conceptual and empirical trajectory, the term did not always carry the 
same meaning. Hofer (1688/1934) focused on Swiss mercenaries fighting away from 
home on behalf of European rulers and described the mercenaries as suffering from 
despondency, weeping, anorexia, and suicidal ideation. Hofer characterized nostalgia 
(or homesickness) “a cerebral disease of essentially demonic cause” (p. 387) which 
was caused by “the quite continuous vibration of animal spirits through those fibers of 
the middle brain in which impressed traces of ideas of the Fatherland still cling” (p. 
384). 
The notion that nostalgia was a neurological disease was firmly ingrained in 
the medical establishment of the time. The only disagreement pertained to the causes 
of the disease. The German-Swiss physician J. J. Scheuchzer maintained in 1732 that 
nostalgia was due to “a sharp differential in atmospheric pressure causing excessive 
body pressurization, which in turn drove blood from the heart to the brain, thereby 
producing the observed affliction of sentiment” (cited in Davis, 1979, p. 2). To make 
matters worse, it was believed that nostalgia was restricted to the Swiss. It was in this 
context that military physicians offered the unremitting clanging of cowbells in the   9 
 
Alps as the cause of nostalgia. The noise, it was said, inflicted damage to the eardrum 
and brain, hence the emotional lability and behavioral symptoms (Davis, 1979). In the 
18
th and 19
th centuries, however, it became clear that nostalgia was not just a Swiss 
curiosity, as soldiers fighting in the French armies and the American Civil War 
manifested similar symptoms (Rosen, 1975). Nevertheless, the definition of nostalgia 
as a neurological disease persisted. 
A major shift in the definition of nostalgia occurred at the end of the 19
th and 
the beginning of the 20
th century. Nostalgia was now regarded as a psychiatric 
disorder (Batcho, 1998; McCann, 1941). Symptoms included anxiety, sadness, 
fatigue, loss of appetite, and insomnia (Havlena & Holak, 1991). Indeed, nostalgia 
was consigned to the realm of disorders until the middle of the 20
th century, its lowly 
status due in no small measure to the psychodynamic tradition (Sohn, 1983). 
Nostalgia was labeled as arising from a subconscious yearning to return to one’s fetal 
state, as a “mentally repressive compulsive disorder” (Fodor, 1950, p. 25), as a 
“monomaniacal obsessive mental state causing intense unhappiness” (Fodor, 1950, p. 
25), and as “immigrant psychosis” (Frost, 1938, p. 801). These extreme views of 
nostalgia gave way to more moderate conceptions. In the late 70s and early 80s, 
nostalgia was considered as a form of depression, “a regressive manifestation closely 
related to the issue of loss, grief, incomplete mourning, and, finally, depression” 
(Castelnuovo-Tedesco, 1980, p. 1000; see also Kaplan, 1987). Furthermore, nostalgia 
was equated with homesickness and confined to four populations: immigrants, first-
year boarding or university students, soldiers, and seamen (Cox, 1988; Jackson, 
1986). 
More recently, the constructs of nostalgia and homesickness have gone their   10 
 
separate ways. Homesickness refers to psychological difficulties that accompany life 
transitions such as to boarding school or university (Brewin, Furhnam, & Howes, 
1989; Fisher, 1989; Stroebe, van Vliet, Hewstone, & Willis, 2002; Van Tilburg, 
Vingerhoets, & van Heck, 1996). Nostalgia, on the other hand, is considered an 
experience with a wider frame of reference. For example, nostalgia is associated more 
frequently than homesickness with the words “warm, old times, childhood, and 
yearning” (Davis, 1979). In agreement with this trend, we also regard nostalgia as 
discrete from homesickness. In particular, we conceptualize nostalgia as yearning for 
aspects of one’s past (e.g., events, persons, places). We maintain that nostalgia is an 
emotional experience that is relevant to people of all ages and is present throughout 
the life course (Sedikides, Wildschut, & Baden, 2004). Below, we further clarify our 
conceptualization of nostalgia while discussing the available theoretical and empirical 
work as well as our own preliminary findings. 
Structure of Nostalgia 
  We will consider three structural features of nostalgia: its triggers, its objects, 
and the role of self. 
Triggers of Nostalgia 
What triggers the nostalgic experience? Although the experience of nostalgia 
critically depends on the capacity for self-directed and temporal attention, theorists 
have speculated that triggers (i.e., stimuli associated with one’s past) can be either 
social (e.g., friends, family reunions, disco nights) or non-social (e.g., music, scents, 
possessions) (Havlena & Holak, 1991; Holak & Havlena, 1998; Holbrook, 1993, 
1994). Davis (1979) suggested that nostalgia occurs in the context of “present fears, 
discontents, anxieties, and uncertainties” (p. 34), whereas Cully, LaVoie, and Gfeller   11 
 
(2001) emphasized dejected mood as a trigger of nostalgia.  
We (Wildschut, Sedikides, Arndt, & Routledge, 2005) asked participants to 
provide detailed descriptions of the circumstances that trigger nostalgia. Contrary to 
some previous speculation but consistent with Davis (1979) and Cully et al. (2001), 
we found that the most common nostalgia trigger is negative mood. One participant, 
for instance, wrote: “I think of nostalgic experiences when I am sad as they often 
make me feel better. Another participant wrote: “I think people would turn to 
nostalgia in unhappy, sad or lonely situations to make themselves smile.” Among the 
negative mood states mentioned, loneliness was by far the most common, as is 
illustrated by the following quote: “If I ever feel lonely or sad I tend to think of my 
friends or family who I haven’t seen in a long time.” Thus, in accord with the mood-
congruency principles discussed earlier, nostalgia can in certain contexts be seen as a 
mood management strategy. Consistently with prior speculation, though, other 
common triggers included sensory inputs and social interactions. Relevant to the idea 
that sensory inputs can trigger nostalgia, one participant remarked that “the strongest 
triggers are smells and music” and another referred to “pictures, smells, sounds, even 
tastes” as triggers of nostalgia. Relevant to the idea that social interaction can trigger 
nostalgia, many commented on how, in the words of one astute participant, nostalgia 
can be triggered by “being in the company of the people concerned.”  
Objects of Nostalgia 
What are the objects of the nostalgic experience? In our research (Wildschut et 
al.,  2005),  the  most  common  objects  of  nostalgia  were  close  others  (e.g.,  friends, 
family members). Consider, for instance, the mother who wrote of her son’s birth: “I 
remember exactly how he looked and smelt the first time I held him in my arms.” The   12 
 
second  most  common  objects  of  nostalgia  were  momentous  events  (e.g., 
anniversaries,  holiday gatherings). Tellingly, momentous events often involved the 
presence of close others and coders occasionally found it difficult to separate the two 
categories. For example, one participant with an eye for detail wrote:  
“My first date with my first boyfriend is a nostalgic event. He picked me up in 
his red Seat Ibiza car at about 5.00. I was wearing a black and red rose dress 
and a suit jacket and he was wearing trousers and a shirt. It was very hot and 
sunny as it was the 14
th of May.”   
Other frequently reported objects were places or settings. This is what one 
participant wrote about moving home: 
“Our furniture had already been taken to the new house and just our family 
was left to say goodbye to the house we’d been living in for 14 years. I 
remember sitting on the stairs thinking of all the good times and bad times we 
had in the house, parties, arguments and growing up.” 
Role of Self: Nostalgia as a Self-Conscious Emotion 
We conceptualized nostalgia as a self-conscious emotion. We considered the 
self as the protagonist of the nostalgic encounter, although we reasoned that the self 
operates in social context (Sedikides et al., 2004). This proposal was supported by our 
empirical findings (Wildschut et al., 2005). In the vast majority of nostalgic accounts, 
the self figured in an important role alongside close others. The following is an 
illustrative excerpt from a representative narrative about a soccer game between the 
English clubs of Chelsea and Aston Villa: 
“When I was seven my step-dad, also a Chelsea fan, announced that he had a   13 
 
spare ticket and upon my persistent begging, he agreed to take me. We caught 
the train to London, then the tube to Fulham Broadway. I remember how 
struck I was by the amount of people and the noise. There is a distinctive smell 
around a football ground, of greasy, frying burgers and stale Tabasco. 
Whenever I smell it now it reminds me of that first experience of it and I 
remember how I fell in love with it there and then. Chelsea was playing Aston 
Villa. We lost 3-0. Tony Daily scored from, as I remember it, near the halfway 
line, the ball going through our keeper, Dave Beasant’s legs. I didn’t care, 
never before or since have I been happy watching Chelsea lose a game of 
football. The day was important because more than just watching a football 
match, it showed that me and my step-dad, who I hadn’t known that long, had 
something in common and it gave me a great sense of security which has never 
left.” 
Is Nostalgia a Positive Emotion? 
Some researchers have classified nostalgia as positive emotion. According to 
Davis (1979), nostalgia is a “positively toned evocation of a lived past” (p. 18), a view 
echoed by Kaplan (1987) in his definition of nostalgia as a “warm feeling about the 
past” (p. 465). Other researchers have also argued that nostalgia is associated with 
positive affect (e.g., Batcho, 1995, 1998; Chaplin, 2000; Gabriel, 1993; Holak & 
Havlena, 1998). An alternative camp of researchers, however, has classified nostalgia 
as a negative emotion. According to Ortony, Clore, and Collins (1988), nostalgia is a 
loss or distress emotion, as it involves sadness or mourning for one’s past. The view 
of nostalgia as a loss emotion is shared by Best and Nelson (1985), Hertz (1990), 
Holbrook (1993, 1994), and Peters (1985). Finally, a third camp of researchers cast   14 
 
nostalgia as an ambivalent emotion. Werman (1977) defined nostalgia as “a joy tinged 
with sadness” (p. 393), whereas both Fodor (1950) and Socarides (1977) proposed 
that nostalgia entails some degree of psychological pain. Finally, Johnson-Laird and 
Oatley (1989) emphasized the ambivalent nature of nostalgia, arguing that it involve 
both happiness and mild discontent. The ambivalence is the outcome of a contrast 
between a satisfying past and a grim present. 
In our view, nostalgia is a predominantly positive emotion, albeit not without 
bittersweet elements (Sedikides et al., 2004). A study by Holak and Havlena (1998) 
provided preliminary support for this view. Participants’ nostalgic accounts (as judged 
by coders) were characterized more by positive (e.g., warmth, joy, gratitude) than 
negative (e.g., sadness, irritation, fear) emotions. More to the point, our own research 
(Wildschut et al., 2005) has obtained evidence that nostalgia is principally a positive 
emotion. Participants’ nostalgic accounts (as judged by independent coders) reflect 
more positive than negative affect, and participants report that nostalgia has more 
desirable than undesirable features. In addition, participants report that they 
experience more positive than negative affect following written descriptions of 
nostalgic events. 
Another way to address the issue of whether nostalgia is a positive or negative 
emotion is to examine its narrative sequence. McAdams and his colleagues 
(McAdams, Diamond, de St. Aubin, & Mansfied, (1997; McAdams, Reynolds, Lewis, 
Patten, & Bowman, 2001) distinguished between two narrative sequences of life 
stories. In the first, redemption, the individual progresses from a disadvantaged to a 
victorious position, with accompanying positive feelings (e.g., contentment, 
happiness). In the second, contamination, the individual progresses from a position of   15 
 
strength to one of weakness, with accompanying negative feelings (e.g., sadness, 
depression). In our research (Wildschut et al., 2005), we found that nostalgic accounts 
more often follow a redemption than a contamination sequence. The high frequency of 
redemption sequences in nostalgic narratives reinforces our view that nostalgia is a 
predominantly positive emotion. These findings further support the notion that 
nostalgia is more likely to be emotionally positive in nature.  
Does Nostalgia Involve a Contrast Between Past and Future? 
  Davis (1979) set forth an interesting hypothesis: Nostalgia is an emotional 
reaction to discontinuity in one’s life. Johnson-Laird and Oatley (1989) echoed the 
discontinuity hypothesis when they argued that nostalgia involves a contrast between 
one’s past and present. According to Davis, sources of discontinuity include death of a 
loved one, health deterioration, relationship break-up, and occupational crises (e.g., 
lay-offs). In addition, discontinuity has emotional consequences, such as “fears, 
discontents, anxieties, or uncertainties” (Davis, 1979, p. 34). 
A more concrete and testable form of the discontinuity hypothesis is that 
individuals who experience discontinuity in their lives (i.e., deteriorating life 
circumstances) will report higher degrees of nostalgia (i.e., will rate the past as more 
favorable) compared to those who experience continuity. Best and Nelson (1985) 
tested this proposition by analyzing data from four surveys which involved U.S. 
national samples and were carried out in 1968, 1974, 1976, and 1980. In these 
surveys, participants responded to statements such as “You are as happy now as you 
were when you were younger,” “People had it better in the old days,” “I am as happy 
as when I was younger,” “These are the best years of my life,” and “In spite of what 
some people say, the lot of the average man is getting worse, not better.” Responses to   16 
 
these statements were combined to form an index of nostalgia. Support for the 
discontinuity hypothesis was equivocal. On the one hand, deteriorating circumstances 
(e.g., health problems, divorce, death of a love one) were related with increased 
nostalgia. On the other hand, occupational mobility, geographic mobility, and work 
interruption were not associated with nostalgia. The equivocal support for the 
discontinuity hypothesis, however, may be due to conceptual and data-analytic 
problems with this study. For example, the survey items (Best & Nelson, 1985) were 
rather poor indicators of nostalgia, and the data were underanalyzed. 
Batcho’s (1995) research is also relevant to the discontinuity hypothesis. She 
assessed nostalgia in a two-part survey. In the first part, respondents evaluated (as 
good or bad) the world at present, 20 years into the future, and in the past. In the 
second part of the survey, participants completed the Nostalgia Inventory, indicating 
the degree to which they missed each of 20 items (toys, your house, friends, the way 
society was, not knowing sad or evil things, not having to worry) from their youth. In 
the first part of the survey, support for the discontinuity hypothesis was weak. On the 
one hand, evaluations of the world across past, future, and present did not differ by 
age or gender. On the other hand, the overall nostalgia score, although uncorrelated 
with judgments of the present or the future, was correlated with judgments of the past. 
Also, when the upper and lower quartile of the respondents were examined, high 
(compared to low) nostalgics rated the world when they were younger as better. In 
general, nostalgia was not linked with substantial dissatisfaction with the present or 
anxieties about the future, but it was associated with the view that the past was better. 
In the second part of the survey, the discontinuity hypothesis was discredited. Age 
main effects were significant for 14 of the 20 items of the Nostalgia Inventory:   17 
 
friends, family, school, house, music, heroes/heroines, feelings, having someone to 
depend on, not knowing sad or evil things, holidays, toys, pets, not having to worry, 
and the way people were. However, on all but two (family, music) of these items, 
younger adults were more nostalgic than older ones. Because it seems reasonable that 
older adults would have experienced more discontinuity than younger adults, these 
results do not seem to follow from the discontinuity hypothesis. 
In a recent study, we (Wildschut, Sedikides, Arndt, Routledge, & Hodgson, 2005) 
tested the discontinuity hypothesis in a sample of thirty-eight adult participants (mean 
age = 48 years). Discontinuity was measured using a revised version of the Social 
Readjustment Rating Scale (SRRS; Holmes & Rahe, 1967). This version of the scale 
asked participants to indicate for each of 14 disrupting life events (e.g., death of a 
close family member, change in living conditions, change in financial situation, 
divorce) whether they had experienced it over the past two years. Nostalgia was 
measured using Batcho’s nostalgia inventory. Consistent with the discontinuity 
hypothesis, results revealed a significant positive correlation between the number of 
disrupting life events experienced and nostalgia. 
In conclusion, there is some support, albeit preliminary, for the discontinuity 
hypothesis. This support comes from correlational studies. We believe that 
experimental tests have greater potential to evaluate rigorously the hypothesis. 
Conceptually, the prior articulations of the hypothesis imply that nostalgia is simply a 
byproduct of discontinuity. Looked at from a different vantage point, however, one 
may construe discontinuity as a form of threat that should in turn evoke more 
nostalgia as people try to marshal positive coping resources. Does threat in the form of 
negative feedback (Sedikides, Reeder, Campbell, & Elliot, 1998) or the awareness of   18 
 
inevitable mortality (mortality salience; e.g., Arndt, Greenberg, Solomon, 
Pyszczynski, & Simon, 1997), for example, induce corresponding changes in the level 
of nostalgia? Given what we believe to be the functional significance of the emotion, 
there are reasons to think that it might. We are in the process of carrying out such 
tests.  
What are the Functions of Nostalgia? 
We propose that nostalgia serves four important psychological functions. First, 
nostalgia serves as a repository of positive affect. Second, nostalgia maintains and 
enhances self-positivity. Third, nostalgia fosters affiliation. Finally, nostalgia carries 
existential meaning, serving as an experiential reservoir that is helpful for coping with 
existential threat. We will review these functions in more detail, complementing them 
with our preliminary findings, and also highlight future directions for empirical study. 
In our research (Wildschut et al., 2005), participants brought to mind and wrote about 
a nostalgic experience or, in the control condition, an ordinary event that occurred in 
the past week. Subsequently, they completed a battery of scales assessing affect, 
aspects of the self-concept, and feelings of affiliation.  
The Positive Affectivity Function of Nostalgia 
We proposed and found (Wildschut et al., 2005) that nostalgia predominantly 
gives rise to positive affect. Kaplan (1987) speculated that the joy that nostalgia 
induces gives rise to “an expansive state of mind” (p. 465). In a similar vein, 
Fredrickson (2001) argued that positive emotions increase resourcefulness, as they 
broaden thought-action repertoires. Indeed, positive emotions offset the impact of not 
only negative emotions (Fredrickson, Tugade, Waugh, & Larkin, 2003) but also 
negative feedback about the self (Aspinwall, 1998; Trope & Pomerantz, 1998; Trope,   19 
 
Igou, & Burke, this volume). We obtained direct evidence for the notion that nostalgia 
has a positive affectivity function (Wildschut et al., 2005): Participants who brought 
to mind or wrote about a nostalgic experience reported more positive affect than 
participants in the control condition, who brought to mind or wrote about an ordinary 
experience. Similarly, in a recent study we found that perceiving the past as positive is 
associated with increased nostalgia proneness (Routledge, Arndt, Sedikides, & 
Wildschut, 2005). Given that nostalgia is associated with positive affect and positive 
affect can assist people in dealing with negative emotions and stressors such as 
negative feedback, future research should further examine the potential for nostalgia 
to be employed to combat negative affect.  
The Self-Positivity Function of Nostalgia 
Individuals are motivated to protect, maintain, and enhance the positivity of 
the self-concept (Sedikides & Strube, 1997; Sedikides & Gregg, 2003). Self-
protection and self-enhancement mechanisms are typically activated when feedback is 
perceived as self-threatening (Baumeister, 1998; Sedikides, Green, & Pinter, 2004). 
We propose that nostalgia constitutes an important mechanism through which 
individuals ward off threat and restore the positivity of the self-concept (Sedikides et 
al., 2004) or self-esteem (Gabriel, 1993; Kaplan, 1987). The effectiveness of nostalgia 
as a self-protection mechanism may be due to its potential to affirm the self (Steele, 
1988) by rendering accessible other desirable aspects of one’s personality. That is, one 
may learn that he failed a test or a project at work, but, by resorting through nostalgia 
to an idealized past, one may affirm himself as a friend, family member, member of 
other important groups (e.g., choir, environmentalists, activists (Kleiner, 1977). The 
proposition that nostalgia serves a self-positivity function received empirical support   20 
 
(Wildschut et al., 2005): Participants who brought to mind or wrote about a nostalgic 
experience reported higher self-esteem than participants in the control condition. This 
finding provides the foundation for future research to explore the possibility  that 
nostalgia can be utilized as a resource for responding to self-related threats in a 
manner that does not aversely affect others (e.g., derogation of outgroups, Fein & 
Spencer, 1997). Nostalgia may therefore be both personally and socially advantageous 
if it provides an outlet for socially positive self-affirmation. 
The Affiliation Function of Nostalgia 
Another important function of nostalgia is the strengthening of social 
connectedness and belongingness. Davis (1979) regarded nostalgia as a deeply social 
emotion, whereas Hertz (1990) noted that, in the nostalgic experience, “…the mind is 
‘peopled’” (p. 195). Symbolic connections with close others are re-established 
(Batcho, 1998; Cavanaugh, 1989; Kaplan, 1987; Mills & Coleman, 1994), and these 
close others come to be momentarily part of one’s present. Such meaningful 
connections are particularly relevant during life transitions (e.g., graduation, 
relocation, new employment), when individuals are likely to feel socially isolated. 
Nostalgia, then, contributes to a sense of safety and secure attachment (Mikulincer, 
Florian, & Hirschberger, 2003). The proposal that nostalgia serves a social 
connectedness function received empirical support (Wildschut et al., 2005): 
Participants who brought to mind and wrote about a nostalgic experience 
subsequently evidenced a more secure adult attachment style than participants in the 
control condition. Future research should further explore the potential for nostalgia to 
help people cope with situations that foster feelings of isolation or disconnection from 
close others. Indeed, for deployed soldiers separated from family, some of the most   21 
 
desired luxuries are objects that remind them of friends and family at home 
(armytimes.com).  
The Existential Function of Nostalgia 
From an existential perspective, one of the primary challenges that people face 
is carving out a meaningful and valued existence within the precariousness of reality. 
We are all too frequently confronted with the transient nature of life and this fragility 
represents a major hurdle that people must cross in order to function with relative 
psychological equanimity. According to terror management theory (Solomon, 
Greenberg, & Pyszczynski, 1991; Pyszczynski, Greenberg, Solomon, Arndt, & 
Schimel, 2004), such anxieties stem, in part, from our awareness of inevitable 
mortality and are mitigated by maintaining a two part anxiety buffer that consists of 
faith in a cultural worldview (shared beliefs about the nature of reality that imbue life 
with meaning) and self-esteem (the sense that one is personally fulfilling the standards 
of one’s worldview). Recently, Mikulincer and colleagues (2003) have argued that 
secure attachment to others represents another fundamental means of buffering 
existential anxiety. 
  How then does nostalgia fit in this picture? As may be gleaned from our prior 
discussion, we argue that nostalgia can bolster each of the psychological mechanisms 
by which people manage existential anxiety. First, as we have previously reviewed, 
nostalgia may serve to enhance the positivity of the self-concept and thus provide vital 
feelings of self-esteem. Second, given the social nature of nostalgic reflection, the 
emotion may enhance connectedness to others, weaving the self into a meaningful 
social fabric. Third, nostalgia can be positioned to contribute an overall sense of 
enduring meaning to one’s life. The passing of time can be threatening, for as time   22 
 
passes the certainty of one’s inevitable demise draws closer (Routledge & Arndt, in 
press). Nostalgia, however, provides an emotional mechanism by which the passing of 
time can be perceived as meaningful as one builds a positive warehouse of memories 
of bygone days. Moreover, nostalgia has the additional effect of soothing existential 
fears by reinforcing the value of cultural traditions. This is achieved by revelling in 
past celebrations of cultural rituals, such as Thanksgiving dinners, school fares, or 
parades, or by collecting movie, sports, or war memorabilia. Through such practices, 
one restores the belief of living a purposeful life in a meaningful cultural context 
(Simon, Arndt, Greenberg, Pyszczynski, & Solomon, 1998). 
  Research that we have recently conducted provides support for the existential 
function of nostalgia (Routledge et al., 2005). Previous terror management research 
demonstrates that the existential threat of being reminded of one’s mortality increases 
investment in and defence of the cultural worldviews that imbue the world with 
meaning (Greenberg, Pyszczynski, & Solomon, 1997). We thus examined how 
nostalgia moderates the effects of mortality salience. For example, in one study we 
(Routledge et al., 2005) found that after being reminded of one’s mortality (relative to 
an aversive control topic), the more one tends to perceive the past as positive, the 
more he or she perceives life as meaningful. In another study, we further found that 
after being reminded of mortality (relative to an aversive control topic), people who 
are more prone to nostalgia actually show less activation of death-related cognition. 
Both studies thus converge to suggest that nostalgia can provide an important resource 
for buffering existential threat. 
  In short, there is encouraging evidence that nostalgia may serve as an 
important resource for managing existential anxieties. It is possible that self-  23 
 
affirmation mediates the effect of nostalgia on existential anxiety. That is, nostalgic 
engagement may affirm the self, and, indeed, research has demonstrated that self-
affirmation (e.g., writing about one’s important values) reduces existential angst 
(Schmeichel & Martens, 2005). Regardless, here also is one example of the broader 
relevance nostalgia research may have to social functioning. Given that the majority of 
terror management research has revealed the often unfortunate consequences that 
people’s efforts to maintain a sense of meaning can have on those who are different 
(e.g., fostering intolerance, prejudice, aggression; Greenberg et al., 1997), an 
important trajectory of future research is to uncover more benevolent means of 
maintaining such views and nostalgia is emerging as a prime candidate to this end. 
Additional Issues Surrounding Nostalgia 
We have argued that nostalgia is a universal emotion that spans the life course. 
Furthermore, nostalgia is a predominantly positive and self-conscious emotion that 
involves reliving momentous events or bygone relationships with significant others. 
Nostalgia is typically triggered by negative mood but also sensory inputs and social 
interactions. Importantly, nostalgia fulfils four psychological functions: positive 
affectivity, self-positivity, affiliation, and buffering against existential terror.  
Many interesting issues await empirical investigation. In the first section of 
this chapter, we briefly covered the interplay between self and affect. We noted, for 
example, the connection between mood and self-focused attention, and the role of 
mood congruency and affect infusion in self-views. How does nostalgia interface with 
these ideas? Nostalgia offers an exciting opportunity to examine the complexities of 
these relationships. It is self-reflective, yet social. Thus, how might nostalgia affect or 
be affected by an internal focus of attention?  It is positive yet at times tinged with   24 
 
bittersweet elements. Thus, what are the congruent or infused moods elicited? 
Further, one might examine whether nostalgia proneness is associated with 
psychological well-being. In support of this notion, Bryant, Smart, and King (in press) 
found that reminiscing about positive memories increases the amount of time that 
experimental (compared to control) participants report as having felt happy over a 
period of a week. As a predominantly positive emotion, nostalgia may also contribute 
to a broader thought-action repertoire (Fredrickson et al., 2003), fostering creative 
thinking and being associated with markers of well-being such as ability to grow, 
plan, and achieve (Huppert, this volume; Taylor, Lerner, Sherman, Sage, & 
McDowell, 2003a). 
In addition, nostalgia may be associated with physical well-being. Three 
informative studies provide some impetus for such a hypothesis. In one study (Danner, 
Snowdon, & Friesen, 2001) the handwritten diaries of elderly Catholic nuns were 
coded for emotional content. The nuns had written these diaries in early adulthood. 
Early positive emotionality predicted survival rates approximately 60 years later. In 
another study (Emmons & McCullough, 2003) positive emotions (e.g., counting one’s 
blessings, gratitude,) predicted physical well-being. Finally, self-positivity—a crucial 
function of nostalgia—was found to be associated with healthy biological profiles 
(Taylor, Lerner, Sherman, Sage, & McDowell, 2003b). 
We (Routledge et al., 2005; Wildschut et al., 2005) obtained empirical support 
for the four functions of nostalgia (positive affectivity, self-positivity, affiliation, 
existential) and are continuing to investigate these functions. Our discussion of 
functions was not meant to be exhaustive. Indeed, theorists have speculated about 
additional functions of nostalgia. For example, Davis (1979; see also Rosen, 1975)   25 
 
has discussed the functions of continuity and accuracy. He proposed that, in nostalgic 
reverie, the individual constructs identity continuity via such processes as “an 
appreciative stance toward former selves; excluding unpleasant memories; 
reinterpreting marginal, fugitive, and eccentric facets of earlier selves in a positive 
light; and establishing benchmarks in one’s biography” (Davis, 1979, pp. 35-46). 
Brown and Humphreys (2002) and Milligan (2003) have also offered speculations on 
the continuity function of nostalgia. In addition, Davis (1979) proposed that nostalgia 
serves an accuracy function, as it is an authentic experience. In particular, “nostalgia 
purports to represent the true places, events, and moods of our past, even if our 
powers of historical reflection may cause us to question whether “it was indeed that 
way” (p. 47). We call for empirical verification of the continuity and accuracy 
functions of nostalgia. 
What kind of persons are more prone to nostalgia and susceptible to its 
consequences? Neuroticism is a variable that has begun to receive increasing attention 
in our research program. Are neurotics more prone to nostalgic engagement when in 
negative than in positive mood? Recent research, showing that high (compared to 
low) neurotics were faster in making evaluative judgments when in negative than in 
positive mood (Tamir & Robinson, 2004) would be consistent with this reasoning. 
Also, are high, compared to low, neurotics more likely to benefit from nostalgic 
reverie in terms of positive affectivity, self-positivity, affiliation, or existential 
soothing? Recent research, showing that high neurotics are more vulnerable to stress 
in situations construed as threatening (Schneider, 2004) would seem to be in line with 
this reasoning. That is, nostalgic reverie may have more “emotional room” to operate 
among high than low neurotics. Alternatively, to the extent that neuroticism is marked   26 
 
by affective instability (Larsen & Ketelaar, 1991; Spangler & Palrecha, 2004) and 
belies a more ambivalent investment in systems of meaning (Arndt & Solomon, 
2003), high neurotics may not be able to marshal mainly positive memories in the 
nostalgic reverie, and this may undermine the palliative effects of the emotion. 
Clearly, then, there is much to be learned through further research. 
Another individual difference variable that is worth empirical attention is 
narcissism. High (compared to low) narcissists are self-centered, interpersonally 
manipulative, and unforgiving, while scoring low on agreeableness, empathy, and 
affiliation (Juola Exline, Baumeister, Bushman, Campbell, & Finkel, 2004; Sedikides, 
Rudich, Gregg, Kumashiro, & Rusbult, 2004). Given that nostalgia is a deeply social 
emotion, we would expect nostalgia proneness to be lower among narcissists than 
non-narcissists. Furthermore, we would expect that nostalgia would be more likely to 
serve a self-positivity than affiliation function for high narcissists, but serve an 
affiliation than self-positivity function for low narcissists. 
Concluding Remarks 
  We began by reviewing several literatures that have a bearing on the interplay 
between self and affect. These literatures concerned the relation between mood and 
self-focused attention, the relation between mood and self-concept valence, and the 
cluster of self-conscious emotions. For the most part, though, we concentrated on a 
neglected self-conscious emotion, nostalgia. We reviewed the literature, introduced a 
re-conceptualization of the construct, and presented new findings from our 
laboratories. 
  Nostalgia shares important similarities with shame, guilt, and embarrassment. 
It implicates strongly the self, it has a motivational component (e.g., goal   27 
 
clarification), and likely has behavioral consequences as well (e.g., phoning a friend or 
family member after feeling nostalgic about them). Also, like guilt and embarrassment 
(but unlike shame), nostalgia is focused on a particular social episode and is relevant 
to a specific facet of one’s self rather than the person as a whole. 
At the same time, nostalgia differs from shame, guilt and embarrassment, in 
important ways. Nostalgia does not necessarily involve a moral element, although 
internal standards may be indirectly activated by bringing to mind a close other. 
Nostalgia is not a painful emotion; to the contrary, it is a positive emotion. Nostalgia 
instigates affiliative, not reparative action. Finally, unlike shame and embarrassment 
(but like guilt) nostalgia may not be associated with a distinct nonverbal display. 
In conclusion, the emotion of nostalgia has long been neglected in the 
psychological literature. This is unfortunate: Nostalgia is universal, prevalent, and 
serves a host of critical psychological functions. We hope that future research will 
redress this empirical imbalance and give this fundamental human experience its 
proper place in the pantheon of emotions. 
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